בתשובה לרודי וגנר, 02/11/15 9:56
זיכרון וצער 666981
בקשר ל"ספר שנמצא במחלוקת...", אני חייב להודות שלא נוח לי להעתיק כל כך הרבה קטעים. האייל לא צריך להיות אתר של העתק-והדבק. אני פשוט חש שאין ברירה.

הספר הוא המקור הקוהרנטי והטוב ביותר מבחינה אקדמית שיש לי. בניגוד לרושם שנוצר אצל חברי "מחנה חוסייני" באייל, הספר אינו טוען שחוסייני הוא אדריכל השואה, אלא שבפעולתיו השונות תרם לה. בכל אופן, טרחתי להעתיק גם את מראי המקום לטענות השונות. אינני יודע מה יכולים הקוראים לעשות עם הפניות למקורות בשפות שונות, שמחייבים גישה לספריה אקדמית או לארכיונים, אבל כנראה שלטענות השונות יש מקורות. לפחות עד שיוכח אחרת.

ביחס להסתה לרצח רצח כנראה שלא הבחנת במשפט:

The differences between the Arab and Jewish races, al-Husaini explained, were the reason for the eternal hostility between them. The conflict had intensified with the advent of Islam because the Jews plotted against Muhammad. This enmity had continued as Muslims recognized they must liberate themselves from the Jews. The struggle “between two races” was rooted in religion and would continue until “one race” was destroyed.52

המקור הוא:

52. “Araber und Muslime befinden sich im Krieg mit dem Judentum,” Radio Berlin, January 28, 1944, in Jeffrey Herf, “Hitlers Dschihad,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, no. 2 (2010): 259–86

לפעילות רדיו ברלין בערבית ראה בבקשה מאמר במידה:

""הו הערבים והמוסלמים! הירגו את היהודים לפני שיהרגו אתכם, הירגו אותם בכל מקום שתמצאו. הדבר נושא חן בעיני אלוהים, ההיסטוריה והדת!" – במילים אלה נפתח השידור של רדיו ברלין ב-‏7 ביולי 1942. הדובר: אורח כבוד בשם חאג' אמין אל-חוסייני, המופתי של ירושלים."

חוסייני התחיל בהסתה בסיגנון כזה עוד בארץ ישראל בשנות השלושים.

As for what should be done to the Jews, al-Husaini was crystal clear, publicly advocating genocide even before the Nazi government did so. His 1937 “Appeal to All Muslims of the World” urged them to cleanse their lands of the Jews, and it was translated into German in 1938.25
...
Al-Husaini’s analysis combined traditional Islamic hatred of Jews with arguments framed by modern political concepts. According to al-Husaini, the Jews were a cursed and evil people. They had exploited Egypt in ancient times and that was why the pharaoh expelled them; an early Muslim historian had accused them of trying to kill Moses; and God had repeatedly punished them for their sins.26 Yet the Jews, al-Husaini continued, had become even worse. They had spread diseases and murdered Jesus.27 They had hated Muhammad and tried to poison him;28 Muhammad had responded by expelling them from Arabia. Even though this plot had failed (he only ate a little of the tainted lamb that the Jews had offered him) the poison had weakened him and led to his premature death.29 Therefore, al-Husaini concluded, Arabs understood why the Germans hated Jews.

25. Amin al-Husaini, “Islam-Judentum: Aufruf des Großmuftis an die islamische Welt 1937,” in Muhammad Sabri, Islam-Judentum-Bolschewismus (Berlin: Juncker & Dünnhaupt, 1938), 22–32.
26. Ibid.
27. Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 174.
28. Tilman Nagel, Mohammed (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 491.

בתקציר השיחה בין היטלר לחוסייני, אכן אין תעוד של בקשה מפורשת להשמיד את היהודים. אבל חוסייני היה בדיאלוג עם הנאצים עוד בשנות השלושים. הנאצים ידעו בדיוק מיהו ומה עמדותיו, והם גם סייעו לו לשמש גייס חמישי לבריטים בארץ ישראל. באשר לשיחה עצמה, היטלר וחוסייני לא "נתקלו" זה בזה, ברור ששיחה כזאת הוכנה מראש.

The grand mufti also made progress in building relations with Berlin and Rome. Starting in 1935, Mussolini financed him.31 By 1936, al-Husaini was sending envoys to Grobba, then German ambassador to Iraq, to request arms and money. One of them was Fauzi ad-Din al-Qawuqji. Born in Beirut in 1890, al-Qawuqji graduated from the Ottoman Istanbul Military Academy. In 1925 he fought in the Kurdish uprising against the French in Syria, and in 1932 he was a military instructor with Iraq’s army. During the revolt he led a two-hundred-man Iraqi-Syrian volunteer unit fighting for al-Husaini. Since Berlin sends Jews to Palestine, he told Grobba, it must also send arms to fight against them.32

Step by step, the Germans responded to al-Husaini’s courting. To investigate this potential ally, an obscure German official considered a top expert on the Jews, Adolf Eichmann, was dispatched to Palestine to meet al-Husaini. Eichmann arrived at the port of Haifa on October 2, 1937. But despite his having a tourist visa, the British authorities restricted his stay to forty-eight hours, after which he was put on a ship to Alexandria. Eichmann went to the British embassy in Cairo but couldn’t persuade that government to change its mind. Instead, Eichmann stayed in Cairo a while and met with the German News Agency man and al-Husaini’s representatives, who came from Jerusalem. He produced a detailed report whose theme was that while Arabs knew little about Nazi ideology, their hatred for Jews and other factors made this ideological difference no barrier to an alliance.
...
As his rebellion failed al-Husaini’s efforts to gain German aid intensified. He was delighted by Hitler’s speech to the German minority in Czechoslovakia when he annexed their area following the September 1938 Munich agreement: “Take the Arab Palestinians as your ideal. With unusual courage they fight both England’s British Empire and the world Jewry. They have no protector or helper. I give you the means and weapons, and all of Germany is behind you.”33 Couldn’t al-Husaini expect that all of Germany would be behind him, too? He sent his nephew Jamal al-Husaini and the important politician Auni Abd al-Hadi to Grobba in Baghdad with a request for guns. Grobba answered that Germany wasn’t ready to back armed Arab uprisings lest that bring confrontation with Britain. But al-Husaini had a solution: the guns could go through the Saudis, whose king agreed to be middleman to hide German involvement.34 The Germans agreed.35 In September 1938, Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence)—and thereafter contact man for al-Husaini’s military and espionage activities—provided Berlin’s first donation, £1,000 sterling, to Hamza, the Saudi envoy. Al-Husaini invested part of it in starting a new, radical Arab Club in Syria to organize support for him there.36

In mid-1939 Canaris provided four thousand rifles as a gift whose use, one of his aides explained, would create a pro-German “fifth column” in Palestine.37 In the end, the Germans bypassed the Saudis and secretly shipped the rifles through Greece to Lebanon, where they were loaded onto small boats for smuggling into Palestine.38 German involvement in Palestine quickly became so important that when U.S. intelligence analysts examined captured German records after World War II, they concluded that al-Husaini’s revolt was able to continue only because of Nazi funding.39 These weapons would also later furnish much of the Palestinian Arab arsenal during the 1947–48 fighting.40

31. Luigi Goglia, “Il Mufti e Mussolini: Alcuni documenti italiani sui rapporti tra nazionalismo palestinese e fascismo negli anni trenta,” Storia Contemporanea 17, no. 6 (1986): 1215.
32. USArchII, FMS, P-207, Fritz Grobba, “Supplement des Gesandten a.D. Dr. Fritz Grobba,” in “German Exploitation of Arab National Movements in World War II” (see above, Chapter 4, note 61), 18; Fauzi Qawuqji, “Memoirs 1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 4 (1972): 27–58: there were sixty-three al-Futtuwa members in 1939; Lebel, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 51; USArchII, RG 338, FMS, P-207, General der Flieger a.D. Hellmuth Felmy, “Die deutsche Ausnutzung der arabischen Eingeborenenbewegung im zweiten Weltkrieg,” in “German Exploitation of Arab National Movements in World War II” (see above, Chapter 4, note 61), 19, 57.
33. Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 40; Zvi Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti: The Essays of Haj Amin (Portland: Mitchell Vallentine, 2009), 11.
34. Grobba, “Die deutsche Ausnutzung der arabischen Eingeborenenbewegung im zweiten Weltkrieg,” Supplement, 19.
35. Helmut Mejcher, “Saudi-Arabiens Beziehungen zu Deutschland in der Regierungszeit von König Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud,” in Der Nahe Osten in der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed. Linda Schatkowski Schilcher and Claus Scharf (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989), 109–127; Michael Wolffsohn, “The German-Saudi Arms Deal on 1936–1939 Reconsidered,” in The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939, ed. Uriel Dann (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 283–300, 288.
36. Grobba, “Supplement,” 20, 23, 30, 33, 40; Flacker, “Fritz Grobba and Nazi Germany’s Middle Eastern Policy,” 123.
37. Grobba, “Supplement,” 21–24; Wilhelm Kohlhaas, Hitler-Abenteuer im Irak (Freiburg: Herder, 1989), 9, 22.
38. Kohlhaas, Hitler-Abenteuer im Irak, 9, 22; Grobba, “Supplement,” 18–19, 23.
39. USArchII, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, No. 792, PS, Original OKW Files Flensburg, Report for Admiral Canaris on Ibn Saud and the Grand Mufti, Staff Evidence, September 17, 1945.
40. Grobba, “Supplement,” 18–19.

לא הייתה הגירה מסיבית של יהודים לארץ ישראל, אך ורק בגלל התנגדות הערבים, ובראשם המתנגד החריף ביותר - חוסייני. לכן זו ציניות מדהימה לטעון שהתנגדותו של חוסייני לא השפיעה על שיקולי הנאצים, מפני שלא עמדה תוכנית כזאת על סדר היום.

האמת היא ש"תוכנית ההעברה", ונושא הגירת היהודים היו הסיבות לפריצת ה"מרד הערבי" בהנהגתו של חוסייני בשנות השלושים. הספר הלבן של 1939 היה נסיון של הבריטים להפיס את דעתם של הערבים לקראת פרוץ המלחמה. חוסייני הוביל את הקו הקיצוני בקרב הערבים. המתונים נטו להסכים להצעות הבריטיות שמשמעותן היתה הקמת מדינה ערבית בארץ ישראל לאחר ישוב המשבר באירופה, וביטל מחוייבותם לבית לאומי ליהודים. חוסייני לעומת זאת, האמין בניצחון גרמניה, נטה להזדהות אידאולוגית עם הנאצים, ושאף להקים מדינה פאן ערבית פשיסטית בראשותו, תחת חסות גרמנית. חוסייני הכשיל כל נסיון פשרה עם הבריטים (הבריטים התנגדו כמובן להקים מייד מדינה ערבית שתהיה פרו נאצית, כפי שדרש חוסייני), ובסופו של דבר הבריטים פירסמו את הספר הלבן של 1939 באופן חד צדדי.

In 1938, with the Peel proposal defeated, war approaching, and radicalism growing, the British decided they needed an even more pro-Arab initiative in tandem with the concessions on Czechoslovakia—in effect, the European equivalent of Palestine—to appease Hitler. The same British government was equally ready to turn over Palestine to Arab rule and leave the Jews there to a dismal fate.51 Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax contacted Iraq’s Foreign Minister as-Suwaidi, moderate Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, and Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud. If they could moderate the grand mufti’s hard line, an Arab-ruled, united Palestine was possible and a major conference would be held in London to discuss a solution.52

By this point, however, the grand mufti was even less interested in a deal. As British policy kowtowed to Germany, al-Husaini was even more convinced the Germans would win.53 He refused even to talk without a prior British guarantee that all of Palestine would become an independent Arab state and that the an-Nashashibi faction would not be allowed to participate in any meetings. Britain refused.

Events in Iraq reinforced al-Husaini’s confidence. On December 25, 1938, radical army officers seized power. Minister of Defense Taha al-Hashimi became president of the radical Palestine Defense Committee, whose fund-raising campaigns attained semiofficial status. Anti-Jewish violence escalated. Al-Husaini could fully depend on Iraqi support.54

Arab governments put together top-level delegations for the London meeting, sensing that it would be a last desperate attempt to settle the Palestine dispute peacefully. Ibn Saud chose his son and foreign minister, Prince (later king) Faisal and Deputy Foreign Minister Fuad Hamza, himself of Palestinian origin. Transjordan was represented by Prime Minister Taufiq Abu al-Huda, also born in Palestine. Egypt sent Ali Mahir along with al-Husaini’s Egyptian ally, Abd ar-Rahman Azzam as an adviser, while Yemen dispatched Prince Saif al-Islam al-Husain.55

The conference’s timing coincided with the height of Jewish desperation over the fascist persecutions in Europe. No country was willing to take Jewish refugees at a moment when new areas of oppression threatened to open in Italy and the Balkans. The Zionists knew that any Jew prevented from reaching Palestine faced the likelihood of death.56

Warning signals of coming war multiplied daily. The London Conference had been planned as Britain was appeasing Hitler. The Germans occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia during its sessions. The opening day, February 7, 1939, was marked by Italian threats to attack Egypt from Libya, coupled with a German general’s touring fortifications near the Libya-Egypt border.57 In this context, the Middle East’s immense strategic significance was at the center of British policymakers’ thoughts. This meant making the Arabs happy. British forces in the area, no matter how strong, would be insufficient if local populations revolted. But once Palestine was amicably resolved, they reasoned, they need not fear a pro-German Arab fifth column or Islamist rebellion.58
...
MacDonald frankly presented the reasons behind British policy. The likelihood of war necessitated surrender to Arab demands as long as such concessions made London feel more secure. Halifax was blunt: “Gentlemen, there are times when the most ethical consideration must give way to administrative necessity.” MacDonald gave the details. Egypt commanded the Suez Canal route to Asia; Alexandria was the only naval base suitable for defending the eastern Mediterranean. Iraq controlled air and land passage to Asia and was Britain’s main source of oil. A hostile Saudi Arabia would threaten British strategic routes. In the event of war, all of these places must be on Great Britain’s side.60

Moshe Sharett, a Zionist leader, tried to counter these arguments. If the Palestine question were settled, he said, Arab governments would merely raise more demands. In the event of war with Germany, Jewish support would be more reliable than Arab pledges. Ben-Gurion added that whatever happened in Palestine, Arab governments would follow their own interests. The Jewish leaders dismissed promises of being protected in an Arab-ruled Palestine, pointing out that the regimes did not even protect Jews in their own countries and insisting that events in Europe made it impossible for them to abandon demands for Jewish immigration.61

The British didn’t care.62 Instead, the British government, believing war would begin within months, offered to accept virtually all the Arab governments’ demands. It proposed a Palestine constitutional conference be held in six months followed by the creation of a Palestine executive council on which Arabs would have 60 percent of the seats. In addition, the council could stop all Jewish immigration in five years.63
...
In response to the Arab rejection, MacDonald embarked on another round of concessions to them. Not only would Jewish immigration be under Arab veto after five years, but even before that time it would be limited to a total of seventy-five thousand people. The proportion of Arabs on the executive council would be raised from 60 to 66 percent. There could be no doubt that the result would be an Arab-ruled Palestine. At this point, Ben-Gurion whispered to a colleague, “They have called this meeting . . . to tell us to give up.”65
...
The British gave in on almost every point. Chamberlain explained, “We are now compelled to consider the Palestine problem mainly from the point of view of its effect on the international situation. . . . If we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.”68 It seemed as if al-Husaini’s radical policy and move toward Germany had succeeded in generating enough leverage to make the British surrender. But London wanted a long interim period. What would be the point of turning over Palestine immediately to al-Husaini only to see him support the Germans? So they wanted to make al-Husaini wait until the European crisis would be resolved. At that point, if he became the head of an independent Arab Palestine there would be little harm to British strategic interests.

52. May, Durch Wüste und Harem, 172–173.
53. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 75, 79.
54. Ibid.; Hamann, Hitlers Wien, 334.
55. Hamann, Hitlers Wien, 191–192.
56. Ibid., 56.
57. Ibid., 239–242, 498, 87–88; Ralf Georg Reuth, Hitler, eine politische Biographie (Munich: Piper, 2003), 32.
58. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 151.
59. Ibid., 13, 64.
60. Ibid., 347.
61. May, Durch Wüste und Harem, 143.
62. Hamann, Hitlers Wien, 544–548.
63. Ibid., 548.
64. Hartmut Schmidt, “‘Will ganz für mich allein bleiben . . .’: Karl Mays Begegnung mit Max von Oppenheim in Kairo,” Karl-May-Haus Information, no. 16 (2003): 15–21.
65. Hans Rühlmann: “Karl May in Kairo (1899),” Karl-May-Jahrbuch (Radebeul: Karl-May-Verlag, 1923), 123–130.
66. USArchII, T120, R3230, Serial 8362H, Frames 590592–95 (PArchAA, PAVII, Politische Beziehungen, Saudisch Arabien Deutschland 1935–1939, vols. 1–2, 385457), “Empfang des Sondergesandten von König Abdul Aziz, Königlicher Rat Khalid Al Hud al-Qarqani, vom Führer auf dem Berghofe, am 17.06.1939, Berlin 20.06.1939, gez. Werner Otto von Hentig.”
67. May, Durch Wüste und Harem, 275.
68. Amin al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini [The memoirs of al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini], ed. Abd al-Karim al-Umar (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), 15.

זיכרון וצער 666998
אני חושש שטעיתי בעריכת התגובה. מראי המקום של הקטע האחרון על הסיבות לעצירת עליית יהודים לארץ, אינם נראים שייכים למקומם. אבדוק מאוחר יותר.
זיכרון וצער 667033
52. New York Times, October 6 and 7, November 10 and 25, and December 7, 1938; Times (London), October 6, 7, and 8, December 7, 1940; Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 192–193.
53. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 746, 754, 779. See also David Yisraeli, “The Third Reich and Palestine,” Middle East Affairs (October 1971): 347.
54. USArchII, Department of State, RG59 67N.01/1280 and /1346, Knabenshue to Hull, November 14 and 25, 1938; U.S. Department of State, RG9 867N.01/1384 and 1429, Knabenshue to Hull, December 30, 1938. Maurice Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain (London: Constable, 1950), 143.
55. USArchII, Department of State, RG59 867N.01/1364, King Ibn Saud to President Roosevelt, December 15, 1938; see also RG59 867N.01/1365 and New York Times, January 15, 1939.
56. Ibid., November 12, 1938.
57. USArchII, Department of State, RG59 890G.911/15, Knabenshue to Hull, February 16, 1939.
58. Great Britain and the East, February 2, 1939.
59. UKArchK, FO371 E754/6/31, Lampson to Foreign Office, January 20, 1939; Journal d’Egypte, January 19, 1939; USArchII, Department of State, RG59 867N.01/1446, Fish to Hull, February 9, 1939.
60. USArchII, Department of State, RG59 867N.01/1441 and /1447, Johnson to Hull, February 7 and 11, 1939; UKArchK, FO371 E1660/6/31 and E1661/6/31; Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, 116; David Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders (New York: Keter Books, 1973), 219, 230–231; New York Times, February 8, 10, and 16, 1939.
61. New York Times, February 8, 10, and 16, 1939.
62. UKArchK, FO371 E1668/6/31 and E1448/6/31, February 23 and 24, 1939; Michael Cohen, “The Palestine White Paper, May 1939: Appeasement in the Middle East,” Historical Journal 16, no. 3 (1973): 584.
63. UKArchK, FO371 E1717/6/31, Peterson to Foreign Office, March 2, 1939; USArchII, Department of State, RG59 867N.01/1472, Bullitt to Hull, March 10, 1939, interview with Weizmann; 1485, Kennedy to Hull, March 20, 1939, interview with MacDonald.
64. UKArchK, FO371 E1253/6/31 and E1254/6/31, Bullard to Foreign Office, February 18, 1939; UKArchK, E1334/6/31, February 20, 1939, and 1459, Johnson to Hull, February 21, 1939.
65. UKArchK, FO371 E1875/6/31, March 7, 1939; Cohen, “The Palestine White Paper,” 586–588; New York Times, February 27, 1939.
66. New York Times, February 27, 1939.
67. Ibid.
68. UKArchK, FO371 File 23231, Lampson to Foreign Office, March 23, 1939; E2541/6/31 and E2724/6/31; E2691/6/31, Lampson to Foreign Office, April 12, 1939; Cohen, “The Palestine White Paper,” 590–591.
זיכרון וצער 667073
1. המשפט "המאבק בין שני הגזעים [הערבי והיהודי] נטוע בדת ולא יסתיים עד להשמדתו של אחד מהם" אינו הסתה לרצח אלא סתם עמדה לאומנית ומיליטיריסטית קיצונית. למעשה, אני מאמין שדוברי כ"ך היו חותמים עליו (רק שהם היו מעדיפים שגזע אחר יושמד).
2. המשפט השני שהבאת (מאתר 'מידה') הוא אכן הסתה לרצח (אבל הוא לא הופיע בציטוט הראשון שלך). מה שכן, בניגוד לכתוב באתר 'מידה', מקורו לא ביולי 42 אלא במרץ 1944:

On 1 March 1944, while speaking on Radio Berlin, al-Husseini said: 'Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you.
(ויקיפדיה באנגלית, עם לא פחות משלושה מקורות שם).

זה קצת מאוחר בכדי שחוסייני באמת ישפיע על ההשמדה וגם לא מוכיח ש'תפקידו' היה הסתה לרצח.
3.בכל המקורות שהובאו, אל-חוסייני תומל בחיסול היהודים *במדינות האיסלאם*. מעולם לא טענתי שהוא היה אנטישמי ומטורף רצחני; השאלה היא השפעתו על התוכנית הנאצית להשמדת היהודים *באירופה* - ובנושא זה יש לך רק ניחושים.

4. התוכנית לגירוש יהודים לא"י נפלה מכיוון שהאזור היה בשליטת בריטניה ולא בגלל התנגדות חוסייני.
זיכרון וצער 667074
אתה כל כך מאוהב ברעיון ה''פלסטיניות'' ובאביו המבחיל, שאתה לא מסוגל להודות באחריותו לשואה, בצורה שגובלת בהכחשתה. תכנית ההעברה נפסקה בגלל שבריטניה סגרה את גבולות הארץ, והיא עשתה כן בלחצו של המופתי, היוזן והמסית העיקרי מאחורי המרד הערבי אשר מטרתו הראשית היתה סגירת גבולות הארץ לעלייה יהודית.
זיכרון וצער 667077
תפסיק כבר לספר לאנשים מה הם. זה לא נעים לקריאה.
זיכרון וצער 667078
ושוב: תגובה 666722.
זיכרון וצער 667084
כמו גבלס, אתה חוזר על השקר שוב ושוב, בתקווה שהוא ''יתפוס'' בסוף
זיכרון וצער 667090
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