בתשובה לאייל בדוי, 30/05/05 19:18
מחשבות חדשות (שלי) על מאמרים ישנים 304782
למיטב זכרונו זה לא אחת האקסיומת של פרמנידס.
היו שם, חוץ מהראשונה שהבאת גם אקסיומת בסגנון ''היש אינו יכול להפוך לאין ואין אינו יכול להפוך ליש''. את היתר די שכחתי, למעט האימרה היפה (שלמיטב זכרוני אינה אחת האקסיומות שלו) שהיש הוא כדור מעוגל היטב.

בכל מקרה, על הסיפא של האקסיומה הראשונה נוהלו ואפשר להמשיך לנהל אינספור דיונים וויכוחים במסגרת הפילוסופיה של הלשון.
מחשבות חדשות (שלי) על מאמרים ישנים 304789
We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides
knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them.

The argument has two divisions: There is the hypothesis that

1. One is.
2. One is not.
If one is, it is nothing.
If one is not, it is everything.

But is and is not may be taken in two senses:
Either one is one,
Or, one has being,

from which opposite consequences are deduced,
1.a. If one is one, it is nothing.
1.b. If one has being, it is all things.

To which are appended two subordinate consequences:
1.aa. If one has being, all other things are.
1.bb. If one is one, all other things are not.

The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis:
2.a. If one is not one, it is all things.
2.b. If one has not being, it is nothing.

Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder:
2.aa. If one is not one, other things are all.
2.bb. If one has not being, other things are not.

טוב פטר, התגברתי על עצלנותי וניגשתי לרגע קט לתרגום על ידי בנג'מין ג'ווט. את ההנחות שכתבתי כתבתי מזכרון אם אני לא טועה מהרצאה שהקשבתי לה (לא מקריאה). את הדיאלוג קראתי אי-אז, הוא אומנם מרשים אך קצת מייבש, אין ספק שיזכה לעיון יותר מעמיק בעתיד :), אני אוסיף את הניתוח היותר מפורט שהיה שם בנספח בתגובה נוספת למיטיבי לכת...
מחשבות חדשות (שלי) על מאמרים ישנים 304791
1.aa. But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place
are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? The others are other
than the one because they have parts, for if they had no parts they would
be simply one, and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise each
part would be a part of many, and being itself one of them, of itself, and
if a part of all, of each one of the other parts, which is absurd. For a
part, if not a part of one, must be a part of all but this one, and if so
not a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, not a part of any
one of many, and so not of one; and if of none, how of all? Therefore a
part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute and perfect
whole or one. And if the others have parts, they must partake of the
whole, and must be the whole of which they are the parts. And each part,
as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute one. And both the whole
and the parts partake of one, for the whole of which the parts are parts is
one, and each part is one part of the whole; and whole and parts as
participating in one are other than one, and as being other than one are
many and infinite; and however small a fraction you separate from them is
many and not one. Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes the others
with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and
also infinite: finite through participation in the one, infinite in their
own nature. And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite,
they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the
highest degree unlike. And all other opposites might without difficulty be
shown to unite in them.

1.bb. Once more, leaving all this: Is there not also an opposite series
of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced
from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others, and
the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and there is no
third existence besides them. And the whole of one cannot be in others nor
parts of it, for it is separated from others and has no parts, and
therefore the others have no unity, nor plurality, nor duality, nor any
other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such as likeness and
unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even. For
if they had these they would partake either of one opposite, and this would
be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a
participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is all things, and likewise
nothing, in relation to one and to the others.

2.a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and
what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition, that one is
not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not. The
subject of any negative proposition implies at once knowledge and
difference. Thus 'one' in the proposition--'The one is not,' must be
something known, or the words would be unintelligible; and again this 'one
which is not' is something different from other things. Moreover, this and
that, some and other, may be all attributed or related to the one which is
not, and which though non-existent may and must have plurality, if the one
only is non-existent and nothing else; but if all is not-being there is
nothing which can be spoken of. Also the one which is not differs, and is
different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they
being other than the one, are unlike the one, which is therefore unlike
them. But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness
of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis; and one cannot be
equal to the others; for that would suppose being in the one, and the
others would be equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if
one does not exist. The one which is not, then, if not equal is unequal to
the others, and in equality implies great and small, and equality lies
between great and small, and therefore the one which is not partakes of
equality. Further, the one which is not has being; for that which is true
is, and it is true that the one is not. And so the one which is not, if
remitting aught of the being of non-existence, would become existent. For
not being implies the being of not-being, and being the not-being of not-
being; or more truly being partakes of the being of being and not of the
being of not-being, and not-being of the being of not-being and not of the
not-being of not-being. And therefore the one which is not has being and
also not-being. And the union of being and not-being involves change or
motion. But how can not-being, which is nowhere, move or change, either
from one place to another or in the same place? And whether it is or is
not, it would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance. The
one which is not, then, is both in motion and at rest, is altered and
unaltered, and becomes and is destroyed, and does not become and is not
destroyed.

2.b. Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in
regard to one? The expression 'is not' implies negation of being:--do we
mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or
do we mean absolutely to deny being of it? The latter. Then the one which
is not can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of
substance or place. Neither can rest, or motion, or greatness, or
smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or
other, or attribute or relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or
knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be asserted of
that which is not.

2.aa. Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? If we speak
of them they must be, and their very name implies difference, and
difference implies relation, not to the one, which is not, but to one
another. And they are others of each other not as units but as infinities,
the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division.
And they will have no unity or number, but only a semblance of unity and
number; and the least of them will appear large and manifold in comparison
with the infinitesimal fractions into which it may be divided. Further,
each particle will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions.
For in passing from the greater to the less it must reach an intermediate
point, which is equality. Moreover, each particle although having a limit
in relation to itself and to other particles, yet it has neither beginning,
middle, nor end; for there is always a beginning before the beginning, and
a middle within the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the
infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one. Thus all being is one
at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike
when near; and also the particles which compose being seem to be like and
unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and
separation, if one is not.

2.bb. Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the
one are, what follows? In the first place, the others will not be the one,
nor the many, for in that case the one would be contained in them; neither
will they appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or
participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not. If
one is not, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or
unlike, in contact or separation. In short, if one is not, nothing is.

The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the
others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and
appear to be and appear not to be, in all manner of ways.

bullshit 304857
bullshit 304922
צ'מע, לא אני כתבתי את זה. אני יודע שזה כאב ראש. פשוט תדלג.
bullshit 304954
אז למה אתה לא נותן את הקרדיט לכותב?
bullshit 305215
לא כתבתי שזה בתרגום בנג'מין ג'ווט? אם לא ברור מזה, זה סיכום שלו. עימו הסליחה.
bullshit 304985
פשוט סיכמתי את הדברים למילה אחת.

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